Public Protocol
Platform

Element 13.23

Incident response and recovery from ransomware

Sheet
13.23
Chapter
13 Digital infrastructure
State
Drafted
Release
16 November 2026
Editor
Contributed by Praecise as open research
Reviewers
To be named at review
Safety
S1, as the chapter
Licence
CC BY-SA 4.0
Resources
6

The element

Requirement

When a machine, an account or the community's data is compromised, named people know what to do, can reach each other without the affected systems, and can restore service from copies the attacker could not touch.

How to tell
  • A written incident response and communications plan exists, is approved by the governing body, is kept in hard copy and offline, and has been exercised (#StopRansomware Guide).
  • Offline, encrypted backups of critical data exist and are tested for availability and integrity on a schedule; the guide notes that many ransomware variants seek out and delete backups they can reach (#StopRansomware Guide). CISA's small-business guidance adds the 3-2-1 rule and the ability to roll back at least seven days (Back Up Business Data).
  • Members are told plainly that reporting a suspected scam, including after clicking a link, will not get them into trouble, and reports are counted as well as clicks (Phishing attacks: defending your organisation).
Options
  • Build response into risk management. NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3, published in April 2025, places incident response inside the six functions of CSF 2.0 rather than as a separate activity (NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management). Fits 300 people with a governing body.
  • Prepare against ransomware specifically. The #StopRansomware Guide covers backups, preconfigured system images kept offline, and a response checklist running from detection and analysis, through reporting and containment, to recovery and lessons learned (#StopRansomware Guide). Fits both scales.
  • A one-page sheet. Who to tell, what to unplug, where the offline copies are, who restores (13.7). Fits 30 adults.
  • Layered defence against phishing. The NCSC sets four layers: make it hard for attackers to reach users, help users spot and report, limit the effects of a successful message, and respond quickly (Phishing attacks: defending your organisation).
Settled, open, contested

Settled. Offline, tested backups and an exercised plan are the core of every guide opened (#StopRansomware Guide, Back Up Business Data, NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management). Blaming people who click discourages reporting (Phishing attacks: defending your organisation). Open. The guides are written for organisations with staff and legal departments; a volunteer-run community has no source written for it. Contested. Whether to pay a ransom is a legal and ethical question the sources opened do not settle for a community; the guide's advice is to report to the authorities and consult them (#StopRansomware Guide).

The four stages

Learn: the response checklist (#StopRansomware Guide) and the CSF framing (NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management). Design: write the plan, the contact list kept off the network, and the restore order of services. Build: offline, encrypted backups and system images (#StopRansomware Guide, restic). Deploy: run a tabletop exercise each year, restore a service from offline copies, and record what was learned.

Resources at each stage

What changes between 30 adults and 300 people

At 30 adults the plan is one page with two names and a phone tree, and the exercise is an evening. At 300 people the plan names roles for coordination, technical work and communication with members and authorities; notification duties under the law of the place are listed (#StopRansomware Guide); and the plan sits within the community's preparedness plans (20.2).

Reference designs

Open for contributions Designs with drawings, specifications and a bill of materials. Add to it

Parts list

Every resource that supports this element. Those marked External carry the label “External resource. Not made or verified by Public Protocol”.

ResourceTypeOriginMaturitySafetyLicence, as stated at its source
Back Up Business DataGuideExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
CISA Cyber EssentialsGuideExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
#StopRansomware GuideGuideExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
Phishing attacks: defending your organisationGuideExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk ManagementGuideExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
resticToolExternalEstablishedS1BSD 2-Clause License

Depends on, and completes

Depends on 13.5, 13.7, 20.2.

It is one of 25 elements that complete Digital infrastructure.

The standing questions

Who can afford this: offline disks and a day a year. Who does the work: a response lead and a deputy, plus a communicator. Who decides: the governing body approves the plan in writing (#StopRansomware Guide); whether and when to tell members and authorities is set in advance, not in the moment.

Environments

For islands and coasts, arctic cold, hot deserts, tropical humid forest, temperate forest, high altitude and flood plains: no source found on how setting changes incident response. Where outside help is days away, the plan cannot rely on calling it; the guides' emphasis on offline copies and hard-copy plans (#StopRansomware Guide) carries more weight there.

Safety

State and evidence

Drafted

An editor has written the element's text from the resources listed under it, citing them. It is checked when it is reviewed.

Evidence from a real place or system is recorded here, with what did not work. What the states mean

History