Public Protocol
Platform

Element 13.24

Securing the controllers of water, power and buildings

Sheet
13.24
Chapter
13 Digital infrastructure
State
Drafted
Release
16 November 2026
Editor
Contributed by Praecise as open research
Reviewers
To be named at review
Safety
S2, as the chapter
Licence
CC BY-SA 4.0
Resources
5

The element

Requirement

The controllers that run the community's water, power, heating and doors cannot be reached from the internet, cannot be taken over with a default password, and can be run by hand when their computers fail.

Caution: these systems move water, current and machinery. A wrong setting can poison water, injure people or damage plant. Changes to them are made by people qualified for that equipment, under its maker's instructions; this element states requirements only.

How to tell

The five mitigations of the joint CISA, FBI, EPA and Department of Energy fact sheet of May 2025 are met (Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology):

  • No operational technology is reachable from the public internet.
  • Every default password is replaced.
  • Any remote access runs over a private connection with phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and least privilege, and dormant accounts are disabled.
  • Control networks are segmented from office and members' networks.
  • Manual operation is practised, and continuity plans, fail-safes, backups and standby systems are tested.

For water and wastewater, the eight actions of the CISA, EPA and FBI fact sheet add regular assessments, an inventory of both operational and information technology, exercised response plans, backups of both, and awareness training (Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems).

Options

For the controllers and boards themselves, see the edge devices chapter; for cameras and sensors, the sensors and cameras chapter.

Settled, open, contested

Settled. Internet exposure and default passwords are the first things every source opened asks owners to remove (Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology, Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems). Open. No open source opened addresses security for very small community utilities run by volunteers. Contested. Remote access: it lets a scarce expert help from far away, and it is a route in. The fact sheet does not forbid it; it asks for a private connection and phishing-resistant sign-in (Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology).

The four stages

Learn: the five mitigations and the eight water actions (Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology, Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems). Design: inventory every controller, draw its network, and decide how each system runs by hand (ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards). Build: segmentation and secure remote access, done by qualified people (Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology). Deploy: practise manual operation, test fail-safes, and review the inventory yearly (Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems).

Resources at each stage

What changes between 30 adults and 300 people

At 30 adults there may be a handful of controllers, often installed by a supplier; the work is to find them, take them off the internet, change their passwords and write the manual procedure. At 300 people the systems form a utility: roles under ISA/IEC 62443 are assigned in contracts (ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards), assessments are regular, and response plans are exercised with the people who run the plant (Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems).

Reference designs

Open for contributions Designs with drawings, specifications and a bill of materials. Add to it

Parts list

Every resource that supports this element. Those marked External carry the label “External resource. Not made or verified by Public Protocol”.

ResourceTypeOriginMaturitySafetyLicence, as stated at its source
Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational TechnologyGuideExternalEstablishedS2Not stated on the page opened
Secure by DesignFrameworkExternalWorkingS1Not stated on the page opened
Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water SystemsGuideExternalEstablishedS2Not stated on the page opened
ISA/IEC 62443 series of standardsStandardExternalEstablishedS2Not stated on the page opened
The UK Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Product Security) regimeStandardExternalEstablishedS1Open Government Licence v3.0, except where otherwise stated

Depends on, and completes

Depends on 13.7, 20.6.

It is one of 25 elements that complete Digital infrastructure.

The standing questions

Who can afford this: the short list costs time; the full standard and an integrator cost money. Who does the work: the operator of each system, with the digital keeper. Who decides: whether a system may be reached remotely, and by whom, is a governance decision (15.3).

Environments

The ability to run by hand matters most where outside help is far away (Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology). For islands and coasts, arctic cold, hot deserts, tropical humid forest, temperate forest, high altitude and flood plains: no source found on how setting changes control system security.

Safety

State and evidence

Drafted

An editor has written the element's text from the resources listed under it, citing them. It is checked when it is reviewed.

Evidence from a real place or system is recorded here, with what did not work. What the states mean

History