Public Protocol
Platform

Element 10.9

Firmware updates and device security

Sheet
10.9
Chapter
10 Electronics and circuit design
State
Drafted
Release
16 November 2026
Editor
Contributed by Praecise as open research
Reviewers
To be named at review
Safety
S1, as the chapter
Licence
CC BY-SA 4.0
Resources
11

The element

Requirement

Every networked device runs only firmware the community has signed, can be updated in the field without being lost if power fails, and has its debug and download routes closed in service.

How to tell
  • Secure boot is on. Espressif recommends secure boot on all production devices and a unique flash encryption key per device (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)). The ESP32-C6 lists RSA-3072 secure boot and AES-XTS flash encryption (ESP32-C6); the RP2350 lists boot signing enforced by mask ROM with the key fingerprint in one-time-programmable memory (RP2350); the nRF54L15 lists secure boot, secure firmware update and tamper detection (nRF54L15).
  • Updates can be rolled back. ESP-IDF keeps a new image active only after it has proved itself, and anti-rollback refuses images below a security version held in eFuses (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)). embassy-boot describes power-fail-safe upgrades with trial boots and rollback (Embassy).
  • Debug is closed: in ESP-IDF, JTAG stays disabled once a security feature is on and UART download moves to a secure mode (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)).
  • The signing key is held by named people, off the build machine.
  • Vulnerability handling meets the law of the market. The Cyber Resilience Act sets reporting duties from 11 September 2026 and main duties from 11 December 2027 (Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847).
Options
  • The chip maker's boot chain, for single-family fleets (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)).
  • MCUboot: an open secure bootloader, independent of operating system, with ports for Zephyr, NuttX, Mynewt, RIOT, Mbed OS, Espressif and Infineon (MCUboot).
  • embassy-boot for Rust firmware (Embassy).
  • Physical update only, by a person with a cable, for devices that are not networked.
Settled, open, contested

Settled: makers of common chips now document secure boot, encrypted flash and rollback (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1), RP2350, nRF54L15). Open: how far these defences hold against someone with the device in hand. In a public prize, four attacks on RP2350 boot security succeeded, all needing physical access; two had no mitigation at the time of the report (Security through transparency: RP2350 hacking challenge results are in). Contested: locking devices or leaving them open. Locked devices resist tampering and theft of data. Open devices can be reflashed and repaired by their owners. A community that holds its own keys can have both; one that buys locked devices cannot.

The four stages

Resources at each stage

What changes between 30 adults and 300 people

At 30 adults, a few devices updated by hand, with secure boot on and the key held by two people. At 300 people, staged over-the-air updates to a test group first, a register of versions, and a written process for revoking a key.

Reference designs

Open for contributions Designs with drawings, specifications and a bill of materials. Add to it

Parts list

Every resource that supports this element. Those marked External carry the label “External resource. Not made or verified by Public Protocol”.

ResourceTypeOriginMaturitySafetyLicence, as stated at its source
EmbassyLibraryExternalWorkingS0Apache License 2.0 or MIT, at the user's option
ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)GuideExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
ESP-IDFToolExternalEstablishedS0Apache-2.0
ESP32-C6ToolExternalEstablishedS0All rights reserved (page copyright notice)
Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847StandardExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EUStandardExternalEstablishedS1Not stated on the page opened
MCUbootToolExternalEstablishedS0Apache-2.0
nRF54L15ToolExternalWorkingS0Not stated on the page opened
RP2350ToolExternalWorkingS0Not stated on the page opened
Security through transparency: RP2350 hacking challenge results are inCase studyExternalWorkingS0Not stated on the page opened
Zephyr ProjectToolExternalEstablishedS0Apache 2.0

Depends on, and completes

Depends on 10.4, 10.6.

It is one of 11 elements that complete Electronics and circuit design.

The standing questions

Who holds the signing key. Who may push an update. Who decides that a device can no longer be trusted.

Environments

No source found for any setting (islands and coasts, arctic cold, hot deserts, tropical humid forest, temperate forest, high altitude, flood plains) on how security or updates change by climate or terrain.

Safety

State and evidence

Drafted

An editor has written the element's text from the resources listed under it, citing them. It is checked when it is reviewed.

Evidence from a real place or system is recorded here, with what did not work. What the states mean

History