Element 10.9
Firmware updates and device security
- Sheet
- 10.9
- State
- Drafted
- Release
- 16 November 2026
- Editor
- Contributed by Praecise as open research
- Reviewers
- To be named at review
- Safety
- S1, as the chapter
- Licence
- CC BY-SA 4.0
- Resources
- 11
The element
- Requirement
Every networked device runs only firmware the community has signed, can be updated in the field without being lost if power fails, and has its debug and download routes closed in service.
- How to tell
- Secure boot is on. Espressif recommends secure boot on all production devices and a unique flash encryption key per device (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)). The ESP32-C6 lists RSA-3072 secure boot and AES-XTS flash encryption (ESP32-C6); the RP2350 lists boot signing enforced by mask ROM with the key fingerprint in one-time-programmable memory (RP2350); the nRF54L15 lists secure boot, secure firmware update and tamper detection (nRF54L15).
- Updates can be rolled back. ESP-IDF keeps a new image active only after it has proved itself, and anti-rollback refuses images below a security version held in eFuses (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)). embassy-boot describes power-fail-safe upgrades with trial boots and rollback (Embassy).
- Debug is closed: in ESP-IDF, JTAG stays disabled once a security feature is on and UART download moves to a secure mode (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)).
- The signing key is held by named people, off the build machine.
- Vulnerability handling meets the law of the market. The Cyber Resilience Act sets reporting duties from 11 September 2026 and main duties from 11 December 2027 (Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847).
- Options
- The chip maker's boot chain, for single-family fleets (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)).
- MCUboot: an open secure bootloader, independent of operating system, with ports for Zephyr, NuttX, Mynewt, RIOT, Mbed OS, Espressif and Infineon (MCUboot).
- embassy-boot for Rust firmware (Embassy).
- Physical update only, by a person with a cable, for devices that are not networked.
- Settled, open, contested
Settled: makers of common chips now document secure boot, encrypted flash and rollback (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1), RP2350, nRF54L15). Open: how far these defences hold against someone with the device in hand. In a public prize, four attacks on RP2350 boot security succeeded, all needing physical access; two had no mitigation at the time of the report (Security through transparency: RP2350 hacking challenge results are in). Contested: locking devices or leaving them open. Locked devices resist tampering and theft of data. Open devices can be reflashed and repaired by their owners. A community that holds its own keys can have both; one that buys locked devices cannot.
The four stages
- Learn: the ESP-IDF security overview (ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1)); MCUboot documentation (MCUboot).
- Design: choose the boot chain and key custody; plan the flash layout for two images (MCUboot, Zephyr Project).
- Build: sign every release in a repeatable build (ESP-IDF, Embassy).
- Deploy: staged rollout, version register, vulnerability handling (Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847).
Resources at each stage
1 Learn
Understand
- ESP32-C6 Tool, S0
- Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU Standard, S1
- nRF54L15 Tool, S0
- RP2350 Tool, S0
- Security through transparency: RP2350 hacking challenge results are in Case study, S0
2 Design
Size and choose
- Embassy Library, S0
- ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1) Guide, S1
- ESP-IDF Tool, S0
- ESP32-C6 Tool, S0
- Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Standard, S1
- Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU Standard, S1
- MCUboot Tool, S0
- nRF54L15 Tool, S0
- RP2350 Tool, S0
- Security through transparency: RP2350 hacking challenge results are in Case study, S0
- Zephyr Project Tool, S0
4 Deploy
Install, run and measure
- ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1) Guide, S1
- ESP-IDF Tool, S0
- Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Standard, S1
- MCUboot Tool, S0
- Zephyr Project Tool, S0
What changes between 30 adults and 300 people
At 30 adults, a few devices updated by hand, with secure boot on and the key held by two people. At 300 people, staged over-the-air updates to a test group first, a register of versions, and a written process for revoking a key.
Reference designs
Open for contributions Designs with drawings, specifications and a bill of materials. Add to it
Parts list
Every resource that supports this element. Those marked External carry the label “External resource. Not made or verified by Public Protocol”.
| Resource | Type | Origin | Maturity | Safety | Licence, as stated at its source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Embassy | Library | External | Working | S0 | Apache License 2.0 or MIT, at the user's option |
| ESP-IDF Security Overview (ESP32-C6, v6.1.1) | Guide | External | Established | S1 | Not stated on the page opened |
| ESP-IDF | Tool | External | Established | S0 | Apache-2.0 |
| ESP32-C6 | Tool | External | Established | S0 | All rights reserved (page copyright notice) |
| Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 | Standard | External | Established | S1 | Not stated on the page opened |
| Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU | Standard | External | Established | S1 | Not stated on the page opened |
| MCUboot | Tool | External | Established | S0 | Apache-2.0 |
| nRF54L15 | Tool | External | Working | S0 | Not stated on the page opened |
| RP2350 | Tool | External | Working | S0 | Not stated on the page opened |
| Security through transparency: RP2350 hacking challenge results are in | Case study | External | Working | S0 | Not stated on the page opened |
| Zephyr Project | Tool | External | Established | S0 | Apache 2.0 |
Depends on, and completes
It is one of 11 elements that complete Electronics and circuit design.
The standing questions
Who holds the signing key. Who may push an update. Who decides that a device can no longer be trusted.
Environments
No source found for any setting (islands and coasts, arctic cold, hot deserts, tropical humid forest, temperate forest, high altitude, flood plains) on how security or updates change by climate or terrain.
Safety
State and evidence
Drafted
An editor has written the element's text from the resources listed under it, citing them. It is checked when it is reviewed.
Evidence from a real place or system is recorded here, with what did not work. What the states mean
History
- Drafted in the release of 16 November 2026.